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Abstract 
Evaluating Legal Learning: The Effects of Time and Development on Adolescents' 
Understanding of Legal Rights 
Rachel Kalbeitzer 
Naomi E. S. Goldstein, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court case, In re Gault (1967), afforded juvenile suspects the due 
process rights to silence and counsel. However, nearly 40 years later, it remains unclear 
as to whether adolescents benefit from these rights. Previous research suggests that youth 
younger than 15 years, as a class, do not demonstrate adequate understanding of their 
rights, fail to appreciate the consequences of waiving their rights, and are at an increased 
risk, compared with adults, of offering a false confession. To address these issues, an 
educational curriculum was developed to teach youth ages 10 through 16 years about 
their rights to silence and counsel. The current dissertation is the second part in a two-part 
study examining the long-term effectiveness of the curriculum. Fifty-seven students 
participated in pre-, post-, and follow-up assessments to determine cognitive (i.e., ability 
to acquire factual knowledge of rights) and psychosocial (i.e., ability to weigh short- and 
long-term consequences of legal decisions) capacities at various developmental stages. 
Findings revealed significant changes in participants' factual understanding of their rights 
from pre- to post-test, with changes maintained one year later. A similar pattern of results 
was found for appreciation of Miranda rights from pre- to post-testing, but only the 13 
and 14 year olds continued to show these improvements one year later, at follow-up 
testing. Changes in scores on measures of psychosocial abilities were less linear, and they 
appeared to be less related to information presented in the curriculum than did scores on 
measures of cognitive abilities.  The implications of these findings are discussed.       
ix 
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1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1: The Juvenile Justice System 
Despite the relative infancy of the American juvenile justice system, it has 
undergone tremendous changes throughout its century-old lifetime.  The juvenile court 
system was founded on the premise that juveniles are different from adults and should not 
be held to the same standard of culpability as their adult counterparts.  Prior to its 
inception, criminal prosecution of children in the United States was drawn from traditions 
in early English common law, in which juveniles aged 15 years and older were treated 
similarly to adults, and, under the infancy clause, children seven years and younger could 
not be criminally charged (Melton, Petrila, Poythress, & Slobogin, 1997).  However, 
blameworthiness was less specific for children ages eight to 14; they were believed to 
have the capacity to form criminal intent, but immaturity could be used as a mitigating 
factor to diminish a youth’s culpability (Bonnie & Grisso, 2000).  
Towards the end of the twentieth century, societal beliefs about childhood began 
to change (Melton et al., 1997).  The industrial revolution demanded increased skills to 
enter the workforce, which introduced a new period of “adolescence.”  This period was 
marked by a higher level of maturity than expected in childhood but lower than expected 
in adulthood.  Adolescence was a period that was characterized by learning, growing, and 
developing to gain the skills necessary to meet the increasing demands of the workforce 
and become contributing members of society.  The identification of this new period 
between childhood and adulthood called for an age-grading of responsibilities, and the 
juvenile court served as the age-graded legal structure to deal with errant youth who were 
not viewed as having the same levels of responsibility in committing illegal acts as adults 
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(Melton et al., 1997).  The underlying principle of the juvenile court was that the state 
would act in parens patriae, or on behalf of youth, and provide them with the treatment, 
rather than punishment, needed to overcome their immature ways (Steinberg & Schwartz, 
2000).  
1.2: The Impact of In re Gault 
In 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, in Miranda v Arizona, that any statement 
stemming from the custodial interrogation of a criminal suspect would be inadmissible 
unless the police provided the suspect with four warnings: (a) the right to remain silent, 
(b) the intent to use the suspect’s statement against the suspect in court, (c) the right to an 
attorney during questioning, and (d) the right to a court appointed attorney for indigent 
suspects. The Court further opined that a suspect may waive these rights if the waiver is 
offered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966).   
At the time of the Miranda decision, the overriding objective in the juvenile court 
was rehabilitation, rather than punishment, and a disposition in juvenile court did not 
carry the same consequences as a criminal sentence.  Thus, the formal protections 
afforded by Miranda to adults in criminal proceedings were viewed as unnecessary in the 
juvenile court.  However, through the landmark decision in In re Gault (1967), the 
Supreme Court forever altered the juvenile justice system by extending due process rights 
and procedural protections to juveniles, including the rights to silence and to counsel.   
In Gault, the Court recognized the inherent problems within the juvenile justice 
system, and it identified juveniles as "persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment" and extended due process rights to juvenile suspects. Ostensibly, extending 
these rights to juveniles would protect them from deprivation of liberty without due 
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process, and these protections would maintain "a balance between the State and the 
individual" (Feld, 2000, p. 108).  However, social scientists (Abramovitch, Peterson-
Badali, & Rohan, 1995; Grisso, 2000) and legal scholars (Bonnie, 1992; Feld, 2000) have 
questioned whether juveniles are capable of receiving the benefits of these protections.  
Specifically, they have raised concerns about juveniles' abilities to understand and 
appreciate their Miranda rights and to provide valid Miranda waivers (Goldstein, Condie, 
Kalbeitzer, Osman, & Geier, 2003; Grisso, 1980).   
Although researchers have initiated attempts to address the questions of juveniles' 
abilities to understand and appreciate their rights, Woolard and Reppucci (2000) 
identified several limitations of these studies, including "concerns about what capacities 
have been studied and how the studies have been designed" (p. 174).  For instance, extant 
research has primarily focused on cognitive factors that influence understanding and 
appreciation of rights (e.g., understanding the semantic meaning of the rights, 
appreciating the significance of the legal situation), but little research has been conducted 
on how developmental, or psychosocial, factors influence adolescents exercising these 
rights (e.g., they may factually understand that they have the right to silence but believe 
that the police have the authority to revoke that right and force adolescents to answer 
their questions).  Furthermore, previous studies have used a cross-sectional methodology 
to assess juveniles' capacities despite the fact that "a longitudinal design is the most 
effective way to examine patterns of change among several variables of interest. In 
competence research, a longitudinal design could elaborate on the relationship among 
changes in cognitive and psychosocial factors across age" (Woolard & Reppucci, 2000, p. 
181).   
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In addition, Woolard and Reppucci (2000) recommended that "intervention 
studies provide a rigorous method for evaluating risks and/or contributors to 
incompetence or ineffective participation" using "theory-based interventions that target 
risks for reduced competence..." (p.182). 
1.3: Overview of this Proposal 
Using the aforementioned recommendations as a guide, the current study aims to 
assess changes in adolescents' understanding of their rights as a result of a theory-based 
educational curriculum for youth ages 10 through 16 and to compare changes in legal 
decision-making over time.  To provide a framework for this study, I first present an 
analysis of the extant literature on adolescents' understanding of their rights to silence and 
counsel.  Next, I discuss the cognitive and psychosocial capacities implicated in 
adolescents' understanding of their rights and whether these capacities can be targeted for 
improvement through intervention.  I then offer an overview of the intervention designed 
to target the changing factors and the methodology used to evaluate the intervention.  
Finally, I discuss the results and limitations of the current study and suggest implications 
for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2: JUVENILES' UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR RIGHTS TO 
SILENCE AND COUNSEL  
To understand and appreciate one's rights and provide a valid waiver, one must 
understand the meaning of the rights, appreciate the consequences of waiving these 
rights, and do so absent of police coercion or intimidation (Grisso, 1981).  Empirical 
evidence over the past 25 years suggests that many juveniles do not, in fact, understand 
their rights.  A comprehensive study conducted in the 1970s with delinquent and 
nondelinquent adolescents found that individuals younger than 15 years, as a class, did 
not demonstrate adequate understanding of their rights.  For older adolescents (i.e., 15 
and 16 year olds), results revealed an interaction effect between age and intelligence in 
predicting understanding of their rights; adolescents with IQ scores below 80 failed to 
understand their rights and those with average IQ scores understood their rights as well as 
adults.  Adolescents 17 years and older understood their rights as well as their adult 
counterparts (Grisso, 1980).  Similar findings were replicated with nondeliquent youth 
(Abramovitch, Peterson-Badali, & Rohan, 1995) and delinquent youth (Goldstein et al., 
2003).     
Furthermore, research supports that adolescents fail to appreciate the 
consequences of waiving their rights.  For instance, a 1977 study found that of 491 
juvenile defendants ages six through 17, charged with various felonies, nearly 90% 
waived their rights to silence and legal counsel (Grisso & Promicter).  Similarly, a study 
examining Miranda waiver decisions with delinquent and nondelinquent juveniles, ages 
13 through 17, found that 96% waived their rights (Ferguson & Douglas, 1970).   
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Empirical evidence also suggests that adolescents are at an increased risk, compared with 
adults, for falsely confessing.  One study found that, in a sample of 154 pre-trial, juvenile 
offenders aged 13 to 19, nearly 60% of the youngest group (i.e., 13 and 14 year olds) 
reported that they would definitely confess to a crime that they did not commit in at least 
one hypothetical police interrogation scenario (Goldstein, Kalbeitzer, Zelle, & Riggs 
Romaine, 2006).  Although this percentage decreased with age, the numbers of juveniles 
who reported that they would falsely confess remained alarmingly high.  Specifically, 
nearly 33% of 15 and 16 year olds and 16% of 17 through 19 year olds said that they 
would definitely offer a false confession in at least one of 26 hypothetical police 
interrogation scenarios.  In another study (Redlich & Goodman, 2003), a community 
sample of participants ranging in age from 12 to 26 years were seated at a computer and 
instructed to type a series of letters without touching the ALT key, as this key would 
crash the computer. After a specific number of letters were typed, the computer screen 
automatically turned black, and participants were asked whether they hit the ALT key. 
Half of the participants were then told that a printout of the keystrokes indicated that they 
had hit the ALT key (i.e., the false-evidence condition), and the other half of the 
participants were told that the printer did not provide the printout (no false evidence 
condition). In the false evidence condition, significantly more 12 to 13 year olds (73%) 
and 15 and 16 year old (88%) signed a statement, written by the investigator, stating, "I 
hit the ALT key and caused the computer to crash. All data were lost" (p.146), than did 
the 18 to 26 years olds (50%). Given that confessions are one of the strongest pieces of 
evidence against a defendant (Kassin & Neumann, 1997), these rates of self-reported 
false confessions are staggering.   
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To determine the validity of a waiver of rights, the majority of jurisdictions use 
the totality of circumstances test.  This test requires courts to examine both characteristics 
of the suspect, such as intelligence, education, and prior experience with police, as well 
as the conditions of the interrogation, such as length of the questioning (Feld, 2000).  
Although the Supreme Court has long recognized that, due to their immaturity and 
vulnerability, adolescent suspects may be more susceptible than adults to police coercion 
and intimidation during interrogations (Gallegos v. Colorado, 1962; Haley v. Ohio, 1948; 
In re Gault, 1967), it held that the totality of circumstances test was “adequate to 
determine whether there has been a waiver even where interrogation of juveniles is 
involved” (Fare v. Michael C., 1979, p. 725).   
Although subsequent cases have extended the list of factors for judges to consider 
when evaluating the validity of a juvenile suspect's waiver, such as age, knowledge of the 
charges, and warning of possible transfer to criminal court (State v. Benoit, 1985; State v. 
Riley, 1976), no case law identifies how courts should evaluate the "impact of the youth's 
developmental status on his ability to make a valid waiver" (Grisso, 1981, p. 117).  To 
account for this, some jurisdictions have employed the "per se" approach.  This approach 
requires that a juvenile defendant's waiver must be made in the presence of an "interested 
adult" (e.g., parent or guardian) to safeguard against the juvenile's cognitive or 
developmental deficiency that may interfere with making an uninformed waiver decision.  
In theory, the youth would be able to consult with his parent to make a more informed 
waiver decision.  However, one study found that involving parents was actually 
ineffective in producing more rational decisions; parents either said nothing to their 
children during the interrogations, or, if they did offer advice, they tended to encourage 
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their children to cooperate with the police rather than exercise their rights to silence and 
counsel (Grisso & Ring, 1979).   
2.1: Juveniles' Capacities for Understanding Miranda Rights  
In recent decades, juvenile sentencing guidelines have become increasingly 
punitive, and newer policies have made transfer to adult court more commonplace 
(Grisso, 1998; Heilbrun, Leheny, Thomas, & Huneycutt, 1997; Poythress, Lexcen, 
Grisso, & Steinberg, 2006).  Given that developmental status is not explicitly examined 
under the totality of circumstances test and the presence of an "interested adult" does not 
appear to be a protective factor against adolescents offering confessions, there is an 
increased need to examine how juveniles themselves reason about their legal rights and 
make legal decisions.   
 Theorists and researchers have suggested that both cognitive and psychosocial 
factors influence juveniles’ decision-making processes (Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000; 
Grisso et al., 2003; Scott, Repucci, & Woolard, 1995). Although much of the extant 
research in this area has focused on legal decision-making in a broad context (e.g., 
adjudicative competence, capacities as trial defendants), similar capacities are required 
for decisions about Miranda rights waivers.  Specifically, Miranda waiver decisions 
require cognitive capacities to obtain the necessary factual knowledge about rights and 
appreciate the adversarial nature of the legal process, and psychosocial capacities to 
foresee the risks of waiving one's rights, appreciate those risks, and be able to weigh 
long-, versus short-term, consequences of waiver decisions.  
Previous research examining adolescents' understanding of Miranda rights has 
generally focused only on the cognitive capacities (e.g., comprehension and appreciation 
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of the warnings) to aid in determining whether youth can validly waive their rights (i.e., 
meet the knowing and intelligent standard) (Grisso, 1980).  However, that model appears 
to be incomplete.  As previous research has suggested (see Scott, 2000; Scott, Reppucci, 
& Woolard, 1995; Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996), individuals reach Miranda waiver 
decisions through the interaction of two distinct capacities, cognitive and psychosocial 
capacities. The cognitive capacities are comprised of a factual understanding of the rights 
(e.g., the semantic meaning of the rights, the meaning of individual words within the 
rights) and an appreciation of the function and significance of those rights (e.g., the idea 
that the rights to silence and counsel are entitlements and protections against self-
incrimination that cannot be taken away).   
However, understanding and appreciating appear to be necessary but not 
sufficient to explain adolescents' decisions about whether to waive their Miranda rights 
in a custodial interrogation.  The other piece, which has attracted little attention in the 
literature until recently, is the capacities associated with psychosocial maturity.  
Specifically, decision-making is influenced by adolescents' capacities to perceive the 
risks of their actions, to assess the likelihood that those risks would happen to them, and 
to weigh short- and long-term consequences of their actions (i.e., future orientation). 
Researchers examining decision making across developmental levels have begun to argue 
that, perhaps, psychosocial factors may be even more relevant to the ultimate decision 
outcome than cognitive factors, as they "may affect decision making in powerful ways 
that distinguish juveniles from adults" (Scott, 2000, p. 301).    
Thus, to examine adolescents' legal decision-making capacities in Miranda 
waivers, we must assess both their cognitive capacities to determine their understanding 
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and appreciation of the rights, as well as their psychosocial capacities to determine how 
these factors may influence the ultimate waiver decision. The specific cognitive and 
psychosocial capacities believed to be implicated in understanding and appreciation of 
legal rights and the legal decision making process are discussed in further detail below.           
2.1.1: Cognitive Factors 
The legal basis for restricting adolescents' autonomy in decision making is 
grounded in the medical doctrine of informed consent, which holds that individuals have 
the right to make decisions about their treatments as long as these decisions are made 
knowingly, competently, and voluntarily (see Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000; Grisso & 
Vierling, 1978; Scott, Reppucci, & Woolard, 1995).  This decision-making paradigm 
provides the framework from which the criteria to validly waive one's rights is drawn; for 
a suspect to validly waive his or her rights, he or she must do so knowingly, intelligently, 
and voluntarily (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966).  The first two criteria of this paradigm are 
related to cognitive capacities; the ability to understand the information and appreciate 
the consequences of decisions.  Thus, much of the research on adolescents' abilities to 
make informed decisions has focused on cognitive factors.  Using Bonnie's (1992) model 
of adolescents' capacities as trial defendants, Grisso (2000) identified four areas of 
adolescents' cognitive capacities that should be examined when evaluating how they 
make legal decisions, including decisions about asserting or waiving their Miranda 
rights.  These areas include understanding the legal process, appreciating the significance 
of legal circumstances, communicating information, and reasoning about legal choices.  
Understanding the legal process.  Specific to Miranda waiver decisions, this area 
encompasses the capacity to understand that one has certain undeniable rights, including 
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the rights to silence and counsel.  Research in this area has found that adolescents' 
understanding is dependent, at least in part, on their cognitive developmental levels (Tapp 
& Levine, 1977).  For instance, theory suggests that preadolescent children have a 
preconventional view of laws and conceptualize rights as something controlled by 
persons in authority.  As they develop, cognitively and socially, adolescents may gain a 
conventional concept of a right, which conceptualizes a right as an entitlement 
guaranteed through a societal agreement that is uniformly beneficial to the collective 
members of the society.  The most advanced conceptualization of a right, the 
postconventional view, is the more abstract understanding that a right is part of the 
fundamental, universal principles that form the basis of the democratic world.  
Research exploring age cutoffs for conceptualizing rights suggests that 
differences exist in understanding between delinquent and nondelinquent youths.  One 
study, conducted with public school children, found that those youth ages 13 and younger 
held a preconventional idea of a right, but youth older than 13 were able to demonstrate 
the more advanced conventional view of a right as a guaranteed entitlement (Melton, 
1980).  However, results from two other studies with samples of juvenile offenders 
suggested that these age cutoffs may not apply to delinquent youth.  Of delinquent 
participants ranging in age from 13 through 17 years, less than 25% conceptualized a 
right in the conventional way; the majority of participants in this age group 
conceptualized a right as something one was "allowed" to do, but that permission could 
be revoked (Grisso, 1981; Lawrence, 1983).   
In sum, research suggests that delinquent youth may be functioning at a lower 
cognitive developmental level than nondelinquent youth when making legal decisions 
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about Miranda waivers.  This developmental difference may influence delinquent youths' 
abilities to meet the "knowing" criterion for a valid waiver.   
Appreciate the significance of legal circumstances.  Factual understanding of 
trial-related information is necessary but not sufficient for the ability to appreciate the 
significance of legal situations.  In other words, an adolescent suspect may factually 
understand that he or she has the right to have an attorney present during police 
questioning, but having that knowledge does not necessarily mean that he or she believes 
it applies to his or her situation.  This distinction becomes an important issue when 
discussing interrogation situations involving adolescent suspects.  Research has shown 
that although adolescents factually understand the advocacy role of the defense attorney, 
many believe that this protection only applies when the defendant is innocent (Grisso, 
1980).  Other research suggests that adolescents incorrectly believe that their attorneys 
can disclose conversations protected by attorney-defendant privilege to the judge 
(Peterson-Badali & Abramovitch, 1992; Schmidt, Reppucci, & Woolard, 1995).         
Communicate information. To meet the "appreciation" criterion for a valid 
Miranda waiver, an adolescent should understand the importance of and have the 
capacity to provide relevant information to his or her attorney about his or her 
involvement in the crime.  Cognitive abilities (i.e., language, perception, and memory) 
may account for some variability in youths' capacities to communicate such information.  
However, these abilities have generally developed sufficiently by early adolescence.  
Therefore, the more critical issue for an adolescent suspect maybe his or her decision 
making about whether to disclose information to his or her attorney (Grisso, 2000).  
Given the previously cited research that many adolescents believe that their attorneys are 
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at liberty to disclose information to judges, it is not surprising that the youth may not be 
entirely truthful with their attorneys.  Research on this specific topic is mixed, however.  
Schmidt, Reppucci, and Woolard (1995) asked 203 juveniles and 110 adults to choose 
one of four decision options, including talk and admit, deny involvement, refuse to talk, 
or other, in an attorney-client vignette.  They found that, compared with adults, juveniles 
were significantly more likely to choose to refuse to communicate with their attorneys.  
More recently, however, researchers found that most juveniles do not seem to 
intentionally withhold information from their attorneys (Tobey, Grisso, & Schwartz, 
2000); the results of this later study are questionable, though, given that only ten 
participants were involved.   
Reasoning about choices.  A distinction must be drawn between making bad 
choices and badly making choices.  In other words, a person may understand all of the 
risks of confessing to a crime that he did not commit, yet legitimately make the poor 
decision of choosing to do so anyway.  In contrast, if a person is unaware that a life 
sentence in prison is a consequence of falsely confessing, and he or she chooses to offer a 
false confession, that decision may be poorly made. Under the informed consent 
framework, an adolescent is entitled to make bad choices as long as he or she has the 
requisite information to make that decision.  However, as a result of limited experience 
and problem-solving deficiencies, adolescents, as a class, may not possess the requisite 
information to make informed decisions.   
Research examining specific problem-solving abilities suggests differences 
between adolescents and adults; adolescents are less able to imagine risky consequences 
during hypothetical scenarios (Kaser-Boyd, Adelman, & Taylor, 1985; Lewis, 1981).  
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Perhaps this is due, at least in part, to adolescents' underestimation of the likelihood of 
negative consequences of different behaviors, compared with adults (Arnett, 2000; 
Phelps, 1987).   
However, even when adolescents' cognitive capacities to weigh consequences are 
similar to those of adults, other factors, such as emotions and stress, may interfere with 
their abilities to activate those capacities because they have been acquired more recently 
and are less well established (Scott, Reppucci, & Woolard, 1995; Steinberg & Cauffman, 
1996).Adolescents have had less experience than adults in dealing with anxiety 
provoking situations, so the stress of interrogations may interfere to a greater degree with 
their abilities to weigh the consequences of waiving their rights (Grisso, 2006).  
2.1.2: Psychosocial Factors 
Examining adolescents' cognitive capacities under the informed consent model 
provides an understanding of some of the factors implicated in their decision making 
about Miranda waivers, but researchers have posited that this model is incomplete (Scott, 
Repucci, & Woolard, 1995; Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996).  Even if adolescents and 
adults understood similar amounts of information to a similar degree, their decisions may 
differ because of developmental factors, such as future time perspective, risk orientation, 
and resistance to peer influence (Scott, Repucci, & Woolard, 1995; Steinberg & Scott, 
2003; Woolard, Reppucci, Steinberg Grisso, & Scott, 2003).   
Future Time Perspective.  Future time perspective may be conceptualized as an 
individual's capacity to recognize, consider, and incorporate the significance of potential 
long-term consequences of various decisions (Woolard et al., 2003).  Research has 
suggested that adolescents tend to weigh the immediate consequences of a decision more 
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heavily, compared with adults who attach more weight to the long-term consequences of 
a decision (Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000; Gardner & Hermann, 1990).  Furthermore, this 
weighting difference is increased for adolescents when the short-term consequences are 
rewarding (Bonnie & Grisso, 2000; Moore & Gullone, 1996).  Thus, adolescents may 
dismiss considering long-term consequences of waiving rights in favor of the short-term 
consequences of pleasing the police officers and reducing the stress of the interrogation. 
Risk Orientation.  Risk orientation refers to an individual's capacity to identify 
potential negative consequences of alternative courses of action, assess the likelihood of 
those negative consequences occurring, and imagine how unpleasant the negative 
consequences would be if they did occur (Woolard et al., 2003). In general, adolescents 
appear to take more risks than do adults.  For example, youth engage in drunk driving, 
unprotected sex, and criminal activity more frequently than do adults (Arnett, 1992).  
Although adolescents generally appear to have the cognitive capacity to identify relevant 
risks when making choices, they appear to conduct the cost-benefit analysis differently 
than do adults.  Specifically, when making choices, youth tend to weigh anticipated gains 
more heavily than losses (Furby & Beyth-Maron, 1990).   
In one study, 570 school-aged adolescents were asked, on an open-ended survey, 
to report various behaviors that they considered "risky" (Moore & Gullone, 1996).  They 
were also asked to report the negative and positive outcomes of such behaviors.  Findings 
revealed that, despite such serious negative consequences as "death," the participants 
tended to report that they would engage in these behaviors anyway because of the 
positive outcomes.  Applying such results to Miranda waivers, perhaps adolescents 
mistakenly focus on what they believe to be positive outcomes of waiving their rights and 
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underestimate the associated risks; they may believe that answering the interrogators 
questions will lead to their release rather than the police using their statements to convict 
them in court.     
Resistance to Peer Influence. Research has consistently found that adolescents are 
more susceptible to peer influence than are adults (Scott, Repucci, & Woolard, 1995; 
Steinberg & Cauffman, 1996; Steinberg & Silverberg, 1986).  Peer influence generally 
operates in one of two ways; through adolescents' comparing their behavior to that of 
their peers (e.g., social comparison) or through their efforts to adapt their behavior and 
attitudes to that of their peers (e.g., conformity) (Scott, 2000).  This area may be 
important in the context of Miranda waivers because of the desire for peer approval.  For 
instance, if a police officer convinces an adolescent suspect that the suspect's friend has 
already confessed and implicated the suspect in the crime, that suspect may believe that 
the socially acceptable thing to do is to confess to the crime to maintain his or her 
friendship with the other adolescent.      
Neurological Research 
A review of recent neuropsychological evidence may be helpful in understanding 
the basis for the findings previously discussed. Neuroimaging studies of brain 
development through adolescence revealed that brain maturation "follows a temporally 
distinct maturational trajectory in which higher-order association areas mature only after 
the lower-order sensorimotor regions" (Gogtay et al., 2004, p. 8177).  In other words, 
areas involved in more complex, higher-order functions, such as planning, judgment, 
impulse control, and decision-making, typically mature later in neurodevelopment than 
the less sophisticated portions of the brain responsible for reacting to initial perceptions 
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of a situation or stimulus. Thus, adolescents typically have diminished capacities for 
weighing short- versus long-term consequences when engaging in risky behaviors.  
Furthermore, because of their diminished abilities to control their impulses, they engage 
in riskier behaviors (e.g., increased susceptibility to drug use) than do adults (Ernst, Pine, 
& Hardin, 2006).   
 Research suggests that two main cortical areas change dramatically during 
adolescence. During puberty, the limbic system, the primary system responsible for 
regulating emotion, may stimulate adolescents to seek higher levels of novelty and to take 
more risks that may contribute to increased emotionality and vulnerability to stress (Dahl, 
2001). At the same time, patterns of development in the prefrontal cortex, which are 
active during complicated tasks involving long-term planning, judgment, and decision-
making, suggest that these higher-order cognitive capacities may be immature well into 
late adolescence (Geidd et al., 1999; Sowell, Thompson, Holmes, Jernigan, & Toga, 
1999) or even into the early to mid 20s.  Consequently, due, at least in part, to their 
immature neurobiological functioning, adolescents may be more susceptible to reacting 
to situations without engaging in deliberate decision-making processes.          
 This neurological research can provide a context for understanding why youth 
tend to have impaired capacities for waiving rights. If the prefrontal cortex, responsible 
for weighing short- and long-term consequences of actions, is still developing during 
adolescence, the adolescent may make a decision to waive his or her rights in an 
interrogation situation to reduce the stress of the situation as quickly as possible, without 
considering the long-term consequence of that decision (i.e., he or she may not be 
released after talking, the information shared can be used to obtain a conviction during a 
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future trial). This lack of future orientation, coupled with the limbic system's incomplete 
development and the increasing vulnerability to stress, may heighten the adolescent's 
desire to escape from a stressful interrogation at almost any cost, which could further 
impair his intellectual weighing of the costs and benefits of waiving his or her rights.   
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CHAPTER 3: OVERVIEW OF THE INTERVENTION 
 Guided by the developmental literature, an educational curriculum was created to 
teach youth ages 10-16 about their constitutional rights to silence and counsel (for 
specific details see Strachan, 2007).  Cognitive and moral development in the 1960s and 
1970s focused on stage theory, which suggested that individuals progress through 
sequential stages of thought in a specific sequence that are qualitatively distinct from one 
another (Kohlberg, 1963, 1969; Piaget, 1970), but the zeitgeist has changed.  The 
developmental stage theory literature designated ages 12 through 16 as the "watershed 
period for thought on matters of government and law" (Levine & Tapp, 1977, p. 87), but 
more recent research has emerged suggesting that similar skills in different task domains 
develop at different rates (Flavell, 1985; Siegler, 1981). For instance, research has 
revealed that development may depend on contextual factors, as well as on individual 
aptitudes (Flavell, 1982), thus making development, in part, idiosyncratic, rather than 
homogenous.  Therefore, from a methodological standpoint, extending the targeted age 
range beyond 12 through 16 years seems important for this study.   
 According to Tapp and Levine (1977), an individual may achieve "legal 
competence" through a socializing condition of "value conflicts" (p. 174) as long as he or 
she first has the substantive information from which conflict can be created.  In other 
words, consider an adolescent's misconception that because police officers enforce the 
law, they also make the laws and can take rights away (Torney, 1977).  Levine and Tapp 
argued that, for this adolescent's understanding to change, he or she must first have a 
factual understanding of his or her rights (i.e., know that he has the right to remain silent 
and right to an attorney); then, he or she should be presented with conflicting information 
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(e.g., a right is a guaranteed entitlement that cannot be taken away), which stimulates 
more complex forms of thought to reconcile his or her preconceived belief with the new 
information.  In addition to the "value conflict" that must be presented, Levine and Tapp 
(1977) posited that, for change in thinking to occur, participation is "crucial for 
stimulating legal development" because it "encourages evaluation and open inquiry" (p. 
175).   
 Using this model as a framework, I developed a one-session intervention to teach 
youth about their Miranda rights. The intervention is an interactive curriculum that 
depicts a police interrogation. The curriculum has three characters: the narrator, the 
police officer, and the student suspect. Using Tapp and Levine's model, I first developed 
pedagogical portions to provide the substantive information about legal rights, in general, 
and Miranda rights, specifically. Next, I presented information that conflicted with 
youths' general misconceptions about their rights.  For instance, a common misperception 
is that children and teenagers who are arrested do not have the right to an attorney 
(Abramovitch & Peterson-Badali, 1995). In contrast, I explained that all suspects, 
regardless of age, have the right to counsel before and during questioning.  Furthermore, I 
encouraged the value shift from compliance with authority to exercising one's right to 
counsel.  Lastly, I incorporated student participation into the intervention to encourage 
the development of legal competence.  A student from the school played the suspect, 
which should, theoretically, have heightened students' engagement in the educational 
assembly. In addition, throughout the curriculum, the narrator directly engaged the 
audience by posing questions and soliciting active participation from the students.      
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CHAPTER 4: THE CURRENT STUDY 
Although a variety of factors, both cognitive and psychosocial, appear to impact 
adolescents' understanding of and decisions about waiving their rights, extant research 
(e.g., Colwell, Cruise, Guy, McCoy, Fernandez, & Ross, 2005;  Grisso et al., 2003; 
Peterson-Badali, Abramovitch, & Duda, 1997) has focused on cross-sectional methods of 
examining how each of these factors, independently, relates to adolescents' understanding 
of rights.  This methodology raises two concerns.  First, because adolescence is a time of 
developmental change, many of the factors primarily associated with adolescents' 
understanding and decision-making may be dynamic (i.e., understanding of legal rights, 
abilities to weigh short- versus long-term consequences of actions, perceptions of risk).  
If these factors are malleable, researchers have questioned whether an instructional 
intervention designed to teach adolescents the factual information and significance of 
their rights would impact their understanding, appreciation, and decisions about how to 
negotiate legal situations (Woolard & Reppucci, 2000). Furthermore, assessing 
relationships between variable factors and adolescents' understanding of rights and legal 
decision-making at one point in time raises the question of reliability of the responses.   
Second, cognitive and psychosocial factors may not be mutually exclusive; 
changes in understanding of rights may lead to changes in values associated with short- 
versus long-term consequences of actions. Given the possibility of this shared 
relationship, it was important to assess the impact of cognitive and psychosocial factors 
on understanding and decision making together, rather than independently.      
The current study addressed both of these issues.  First, this dissertation is the 
second part of a two-part study designed to examine the effectiveness of a Miranda rights 
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educational curriculum on adolescents' understanding of their rights and legal decision-
making capacities.  The first part of the study aimed to assess short-term changes in 
students' understanding of their rights as a result of the Miranda rights educational 
curriculum (see Strachan, 2007).  This dissertation attempted to evaluate the long-term 
effectiveness of the curriculum by examining whether the participants retained the 
information discussed during the educational curriculum. 
Second, I simultaneously assessed both cognitive and psychosocial factors related 
to adolescents' understanding of their rights, appreciation of the consequences of waiving 
their rights, and reasoning about their decisions that could be made during a variety of 
police interrogation situations.  Using this methodology, I examined the influence of 
cognitive and psychosocial maturation on participants' responses.  For instance, cognitive 
maturation may have deepened an adolescent's understanding of his or her right to 
counsel, which, in turn, may have deepened his or her appreciation for communicating 
honestly with his or her attorney.  Furthermore, enhanced understanding of the legal 
process may have led to a psychosocial values change from short-term gains to 
consideration of long-term consequences in interrogation scenarios.   
Importantly, participants who completed the hour-long educational curriculum 
were not expected to become advanced legal decision-makers.  Instead, the purpose of 
this dissertation was to consider the role of cognitive and psychosocial maturation in the 
development of basic legal reasoning skills.      
Generally, I expected improvements in cognitive and psychosocial factors 
associated with Miranda comprehension and legal decision-making to vary differentially 
across age groups over time. Specifically, regarding changes in cognitive factors 
23 
associated with Miranda decisions, the 10 to 12 year olds should have had the most room 
for improvement, but they should have demonstrated the least improvement because of 
the lack of cognitive capacities needed to acquire information about the abstract concept 
of a legal right.  The 13 and 14 year olds should have demonstrated the most 
improvement because they should have had the cognitive capacities to learn about their 
rights but not yet acquired accurate information about rights or developed mature legal 
reasoning skills.  Lastly, 15 and 16 year olds should have improved little because these 
students (from a sample with average to above average intelligence) should have already 
had adequate or nearly adequate knowledge and reasoning skills prior to the educational 
curriculum.  
Regarding psychosocial factors associated with Miranda decisions, I expected a 
somewhat different trend.  Although the 15 and 16 year olds may have had adequate 
knowledge of rights at pre- and post-testing, their legal reasoning / decision-making skills 
(i.e., abilities to recognize long-term consequences of waiver and non-waiver decisions), 
should have still been fairly immature at that time; however, this age group should have 
been psychosocially mature enough to gain reasoning skills if taught (see Grisso, 2000).  
In other words, it was expected that participants in this age group would discuss the 
material presented during the curriculum with friends, teachers, and parents.  These 
discussions would have likely led to a deeper understanding of the implications of 
waiving their rights. Specifically, I expected that, after a year of maturation and 
processing the material from the curriculum, they would be able to identify more negative 
consequences of waiving rights, would rate these negative consequences as more likely to 
happen if they were to waive their rights, and would identify a greater number of long- 
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versus short-term consequences of waiving rights, compared to their pre- and post-
assessments.  Thus, I predicted that the 15 and 16 year olds would demonstrate the 
greatest improvement in their abilities to generate a more extensive list of consequences 
of their decisions, followed by 13 and 14 year olds, and trailed by the 11 and 12 year 
olds.  Pre-adolescence and adolescence are critical developmental periods, and cognitive 
and psychosocial maturation during these times may not be linear.  
4.1: Hypotheses 
I evaluated each hypothesis using a two-step process to detect: (1) whether 
significant changes in the outcome variables were detected at follow-up (see below: 
hypothesis, part a), and (2) if significant changes existed at follow-up, I conducted an 
additional analysis to attempt to rule out the possibility that the changes were due just to 
maturation and the additional year of school (see below: hypothesis, part b).   
 No control group was used for this study.  The Miranda educational curriculum 
was administered as part of Tower Hill's academic assembly schedule, so all students in 
the school participated.  Although I considered using another school as a control group, 
between school differences seemed likely to confound the interpretation of findings.  
Therefore, in lieu of a control group and to rule out changes due purely to 
maturation and the additional year of school, participants' scores on the measures at one-
year follow-up were compared with scores from same-aged peers at pre-test (i.e., 15 year 
olds' scores at follow-up were compared with 15 year olds' scores at pre-test).  Using this 
method, one would expect that, if the curriculum had no effect, scores at follow-up would 
be similar to scores of same-aged peers at pre-test; adolescents of similar ages would 
perform similarly on the measures.  Alternatively, significantly different scores from the 
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two time periods would suggest that changes might be attributable to the curriculum; 
adolescents who participated in the curriculum would achieve higher scores than same-
age peers who had not yet participated in the curriculum. The following were the primary 
and secondary hypotheses for the study: 
Primary Hypotheses: 
1. Youth of various ages would differentially improve over time in their understanding 
of Miranda rights as a result of the Miranda rights educational curriculum. 
a. I expected to find an interaction between time (pre-, post-, and follow-up) and age 
(11 and 12 year olds, 13 and 14 year olds, and 15 and 16 year olds) in amount of 
improvement in average scores on the Miranda Rights Comprehension Instrument 
- II (MRCI-II), with 13 and 14 year olds' scores changing the most.  The 11 and 12 
year olds and 15 and 16 year olds were expected to demonstrate less change in 
their understanding of rights.  The younger group was expected to obtain 
consistently low scores across time because they should not have had the 
cognitive capacities to grasp the abstract concept of a legal right.  The 15 and 16 
year olds were expected to obtain consistently high scores across time because 
youth at this developmental level, likely, possessed adequate knowledge of rights 
prior to the assembly.  
b. At one year follow-up, youth were expected to have higher average scores on the 
MRCI-II than were same-age peers at pre-test (e.g., 15 year olds at follow-up 
versus 15 year olds at pre-test). 
2. Youth of various ages would differentially improve over time in their appreciation of 
the significance of the Miranda warning as a result of the Miranda rights educational 
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curriculum.  
a. I expected to find an interaction between time (pre-, post-, and follow-up) and age 
(11 and 12 year olds, 13 and 14 year olds, and 15 and 16 year olds) in amount of 
improvement in scores on FRI of the MRCI-II, with 13 and 14 year olds' scores 
changing the most.  The 11 and 12 year olds were expected to demonstrate little 
change in their appreciation of rights because they, likely, lacked the requisite 
cognitive capacity; thus they were expected to have consistently low scores across 
time.  The 15 and 16 year olds were expected to demonstrate little change in 
scores because they, likely, had adequate appreciation of the significance of their 
rights before the assembly and, thus, were expected to obtain consistently high 
scores across time.  
b. At one year follow-up, youth were expected to have higher scores on the FRI than 
were same-age peers at pre-test (e.g., 15 year olds at follow-up versus15 year olds 
at pre-test). 
3. Youth of various ages would differentially improve over time in their reported 
likelihood of offering a false confession in a variety of interrogation scenarios.   
a. I expected to find an interaction between time (pre-, post-, and follow-up) and age 
(11 and 12 year olds, 13 and 14 year olds, and 15 and 16 year olds) in youths' self-
reported likelihood of offering a false confession on the P-CHIP, Part c, with 13 
and 14 year olds' scores changing the most, and 11 and 12 year olds' and 15 and 16 
years olds' scores changing less.  As a result of lacking the requisite cognitive 
capacity to understand the implications of falsely confessing, the 11 and 12 year 
olds were expected to obtain consistently low P-CHIP, Part c scores (i.e., report 
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offering more false confessions) across time.  In addition, the 15 and 16 year olds 
were expected to have consistently high P-CHIP, Part c scores (i.e., report that 
they would be less likely to offer false confessions) over time as a result of their 
cognitive capacity to understand the implications of offering a false confession.  
b. At one year follow-up, youth were expected to have lower scores on the P-CHIP, 
Part c (i.e., less likely to report offering a false confession) than were same-age 
peers at pre-test (e.g., 15 year olds at follow-up versus15 year olds at pre-test). 
4. Youth of various ages were expected to differentially improve over time in their risk 
orientation when reasoning about waiver and non-waiver decisions. 
a. I expected to find an interaction between time (pre-, post-, and follow-up) and age 
(11 and 12 year olds, 13 and 14 year olds, and 15 and 16 year olds) on the JILC 
R-Rec1 (i.e., the number of negative consequences that youth identify), with 15 
and 16 year olds' scores changing the most (i.e., at follow-up, they should have 
been able to recognize the highest number of negative consequences and been 
more oriented to negative outcomes than positive outcomes).  Because of the 
expected linear development of reasoning capacities, I hypothesized that, across 
time, 13 and 14 year olds' scores would demonstrate less change than the elder 
age group but more change than the youngest age group. 
b. I expected to find an interaction between time (pre-, post-, and follow-up) and age 
on the JILC R-APP1 (i.e., the likelihood for negative consequences) and on the R-
APP2 (i.e., the unpleasantness of negative outcomes), with, 15 and 16 year olds' 
scores changing the most across time, 13 and 14 year olds' scores changing less, 
and 11 and 12 year olds' scores changing the least.   
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c. At one year follow-up, youth were expected to have higher scores on the JILC R-
Rec1, R-APP1, and R-APP2 than did same-age peers at pre-test (e.g., 15 year olds 
at follow-up versus15 year olds at pre-test). 
5. Youth of various ages would differentially improve over time in their future 
orientation when reasoning about waiver and non-waiver decisions. 
a. I expected to find an interaction between time (pre-, post-, and follow-up) and age 
on the JILC F-Rec1 (i.e., number of long-term consequences that youth identify) 
and F-Rec3 (i.e., the main reason for choosing waiver or nonwaiver option), with 
15 and 16 year olds' scores changing the most (i.e., at follow-up, they would be 
able to recognize the most long-term consequences, would be more oriented to 
long-term consequences, and would be most likely to choose a long term 
consequence as the main reason for a waiver decision), 13 and 14 year olds' 
scores would change less, and 11 and 12 year olds' scores would change the least. 
b. At one year follow-up, youth were expected to have higher scores on the JILC F-
Rec1 and F-Rec3 than did same-age peers at pre-test (e.g., 15 year olds at follow-
up versus15 year olds at pre-test). 
Secondary Hypotheses 
1. Youths' choices of the best option on the JILC were expected to be related to their 
attitudes towards authority. 
2. Youths' recognition of risks on the JILC were expected to mediate the relationship 
between age and appreciation of the significance of the Miranda warning but not 
between age and understanding of rights.   
3. Youths' improved comprehension, improved appreciation of the significance of their 
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rights, and improved abilities to consider a greater number of options and associated 
consequences about waiver and non-waiver decisions were expected not to be 
independently related to their previous experience with Miranda warnings.  
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CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHOD 
5.1: Participants 
Sixty-four students between 10 and 16 years of age who were enrolled in 5th 
through 10th grades at the Tower Hill School in Wilmington, Delaware during the 2005-
2006 academic year were recruited to participate in the study. The Tower Hill School is a 
private, college preparatory school for students from kindergarten through twelfth grade.  
The majority of Tower Hill students are Caucasian, from middle- to upper-middle SES 
backgrounds, from two-parent homes, and have a history of academic achievement that is 
commensurate with or above grade-level.  Although this middle to upper SES population 
does not represent adolescents who are typically involved in custodial interrogation 
situations, this population was specifically chosen to examine the program's effectiveness 
in an ideal educational situation.  The students of the Tower Hill School were chosen on 
the theory that if these youth had difficulty understanding and retaining the material, the 
curriculum would be unlikely to benefit at-risk youth who typically have higher rates of 
learning and academic difficulties and attention deficit disorders (see Kazdin, 2000), as 
well as below average IQ scores (Goldstein, Condie, Kalbeitzer, Osman, & Geier, 2003; 
Loeber, Farrington, Stouthamer-Loeber, Moffitt, & Caspi, 1998; Viljoen, Klaver, & 
Roesch, 2005). 
Previous studies have consistently found that older youth (i.e., 16 and older) 
understand and appreciate the Miranda rights about as well as adults (Goldstein et al., 
2003; Grisso, 1980).  In addition, research suggests that adolescents younger than 15 are 
at heightened risk for deficits in Miranda comprehension (Peterson-Badali & 
Abramovitch, 1992; Grisso, 1980), with arrests of youth younger than 10 being very rare 
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(Snyder & Sickmund, 2006).  Thus, our target age group consisted of 10 through 16 year 
olds because understanding of Miranda is typically irrelevant for youth younger than 10 
years old, and Miranda understanding appears to parallel that of adults for adolescents 16 
years and older. 
Of the 64 students who were recruited, 60 students participated in the study at 
post-test, and 57 students participated in all three testing sessions, resulting in an 89.1% 
retention rate.  At post-test, one 10-year-old student declined to participate and three 
others (two 14 year olds and one 15 year old) had been absent the day of the intervention 
assembly. Thus, these students were not interviewed at post-test or follow-up.  At follow-
up testing, an additional three students did not complete the assessments; a 13-year-old 
student and a 15-year-old student were no longer attending the Tower Hill School, and an 
11-year-old student declined to participate.   
Of the 57 students who completed all three assessment sessions, 33 (57.9%) were 
female.  The majority of participants identified themselves as Caucasian (84.2%), with 
7% identified as African American, 7% identified as Asian, and 1.8% identified as other.  
The mean verbal IQ (VIQ) score for the sample was 119.41 (SD = 11.34). Although no 
significant differences in VIQ scores were found between age groups (F (2, 60) = 2.60, p 
= .08), a large effect size was found (f = .42). This suggests that there may be 
meaningful, although not statistically significant, differences in VIQ scores between the 
groups (see Table 1 for demographic characteristics by age group).   
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Table 1: Demographic Characteristics by Age Group 
 
Age Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 -12 
 
 
13 & 14 
 
 
15 & 16 
 
N 
 
21 
 
24 
 
19 
 
VIQ Mean (SD) 
 
 
116.0 (11.6) 
 
123.5 (10.7) 
 
118.1 (11.3) 
Ethnicity (%) 
 
Caucasian 
African-American 
Asian
Other 
 
 
 
85.7 
 
4.8 
 
4.8 
 
4.8 
 
 
83.3 
 
12.5 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
89.5 
 
- 
 
10.5 
 
- 
 
 
 
As part of the demographic questionnaire administered at pre-test, participants 
were asked to report (a) if they had heard of the Miranda warnings before, and, (b) if so, 
from what sources had they obtained information about the warnings. The majority of 
participants (62.5%) identified having heard the Miranda warnings at least once in the 
past, 29.7% denied having heard the warnings in the past, and 7.8% did not report 
whether or not they had heard the warnings in the past. The single most common reported 
exposure to the warnings was through television shows (15.6%), but the largest 
percentage of the participants (20.3%) reported that they were exposed to the warnings 
through a combination of sources, all of which included television shows. Frequency and 
sources of exposure differed across age groups (see Figure 1 for specific sources of 
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exposure by age group). Although, overall, previous exposure (i.e., yes or no) to the 
Miranda warnings was not significantly related to age (χ2(2) = 3.30, p = .19), significant 
differences were found between the 10 to 12 year olds and the 15 and 16 year olds (χ2(2) 
= 6.08, p <.048), with nearly half of the 10 to 12 year olds (44%) reporting no previous 
exposure to the warnings and only 17% of the 15 and 16 year olds reporting no previous 
exposure.  
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Figure 1: Sources of Exposure to Miranda Warnings by Age Group 
 
 
 
5.2: Measures 
 Demographics questionnaire.  This questionnaire was created specifically for the 
first part of the study.  Participants provided information about their age, race, and 
sources of previous exposure to the Miranda warnings (e.g., television, movies, parents, 
etc.).  
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Harcourt Press, 1999).  The 
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WASI is a standardized measure of intellectual functioning. It is comprised of four 
subtests, yielding a Verbal IQ (VIQ) score, a Performance IQ (PIQ) score, and a Full 
Scale IQ (FSIQ) score.  However, only the verbal scales were used, as a strong 
relationship has been shown between VIQ scores and scores on measures assessing 
Miranda comprehension (Colwell et al., 2005). The verbal scale subtests included: (1) 
Vocabulary, which is a measure of an individual's expressive vocabulary and verbal 
knowledge; and (2) Similarities, which is a measure of an individual's conceptual verbal 
knowledge and abstract reasoning ability.   
Miranda Rights Comprehension Instruments – II (MRCI-II) (Goldstein, Condie, 
& Grisso, in preparation).  This instrument is a revised version of Grisso's (1998) 
Instruments for Assessing Understanding and Appreciation of Miranda Rights.  The 
instrument consists of four discrete measures that assess factual understanding and 
appreciation of Miranda rights in interrogation situations.  A fifth measure, Perceptions 
of Coercion during the Holding and Interrogation Process (P-CHIP), assesses an 
examinee's self-reported likelihood of offering false confessions in a variety of 
interrogation scenarios.  Grisso's original instruments have acceptable psychometric 
properties (Grisso, 1998) and are widely accepted in clinical and research contexts to 
evaluate suspects' understanding and appreciation of the Miranda warning (Lally, 2003; 
Ryba, Brodsky, & Schlosberg, 2007).  
Preliminary research with the revised instruments suggests that they have 
similarly acceptable psychometric properties (Kalbeitzer, Goldstein, Riggs Romaine, 
Mesiarik, & Zelle, 2008).  Test-retest reliability for each of the MRCI-II instruments was 
as follows: CMR-II (r = .61, p < .01); CMR-R-II (r = .75, p < .01); FRI (r = .53, p < .01); 
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CMV-II (r = .77, p < .01); P-CHIP, Part A (r = .76, p < .01); P-CHIP, Part B (r = .71, p < 
.01); and P-CHIP, Part c (r = .77, p < .01). 
Inter-rater reliability was established for the CMR-II, FRI, and CMV-II by 
calculating the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC).  Specifically, for the CMR-II, an 
ICC of .97 was obtained, an ICC of .99 was obtained for the FRI, and an ICC of .98 was 
obtained for the CMV-II (Kalbeitzer et al., 2008).   
Content and construct validity were established for all instruments (Kalbeitzer, et 
al., 2008).  Content of the CMR-II, CMR-R-II, and CMV-II is based on language in actual 
Miranda warnings.  Scenarios presented in the FRI are replications of actual situations 
that may arise during police interrogations.  Therefore, the content validity of the FRI is 
embedded in the questions that are asked based on the presented scenarios.  The content 
for the P-CHIP is based on techniques found in popular police training manuals (e.g., 
Inbau, Reid, & Buckley, 1986).  Because juvenile offenders are likely to come into 
contact with police who use many of these techniques when trying to secure a confession, 
this measure demonstrates content validity.  
To establish construct validity, performance on an instrument should correlate 
with factors that the instrument is intended to represent.  Thus, Goldstein and colleagues 
(2003) examined the relationship between Miranda comprehension and age and 
intelligence to establish construct validity for the MRCI-II.  The Verbal subtests of the 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Harcourt Assessment, 1999) were 
used to measure intelligence because verbal IQ correlates significantly with general 
intelligence (Kaufman & Lichtenberger, 2002).  Regression analyses indicated that 
Verbal IQ and age independently predicted Miranda comprehension (bage = .07, SEage = 
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.02, p < .01; bVIQ = .01, SEVIQ = .002, p < .01).     
The MRCI-II consists of the following measures:  
(1) Comprehension of Miranda Rights-II (CMR-II).  This instrument assesses 
adolescents’ understanding of each of the Miranda warnings.  The examiner reads each 
warning aloud and asks the examinee to paraphrase the conceptual meaning of the 
warning in his or her own words.  Scores on the CMR-II range from 0 to 10 points.  
Responses are scored according to standardized criteria to determine if the adolescent’s 
responses are adequate (score of 2), questionable (score of 1), or inadequate (score of 0).  
Changes made to the revised version of this instrument included simplifying the wording 
of the warning and adding the fifth prong that is given in jurisdictions today.   
(2) Comprehension of Miranda Rights-Recognition-II (CMR-R-II).  This 
instrument asks the examinee to identify statements as semantically the same or different 
from each Miranda right.  This instrument assesses the adolescent’s understanding of the 
Miranda rights without reliance on verbal expressive abilities.  Scores on the CMR-R-II 
range from 0 to 15.  Correct responses are awarded 1 point each, and incorrect responses 
are awarded 0 points.  Similar changes were made to the revised version of this 
instrument as those made to the CMR-II.   
(3) Function of Rights in Interrogation (FRI).  This instrument uses hypothetical 
vignettes to assess the examinee’s perception of the function and significance of the 
Miranda warnings within the context of legal proceedings.  The examinee is presented 
with four pictures and corresponding vignettes that depict scenarios commonly 
experienced by criminal defendants. The examinee is asked 15 standardized questions to 
assess appreciation of the warnings across three subscales: (1) Nature of Interrogation 
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Subscale (NI), which assesses the examinee’s perceptions of the roles of the police and 
the suspect in an interrogation; (2) the Right to Counsel Subscale (RC), which examines 
the adolescent’s perception of the role of the attorney in legal proceedings; and  (3) Right 
to Silence Subscale (RS), which assesses the adolescent’s perception of the significance 
of the right to silence. Item scores range from 0 (inadequate response) to 2 (adequate 
response), with a possible total score ranging from 0 to 30.  No changes were made to 
this measure in the revised instruments.   
(4) Comprehension of Miranda Vocabulary-II (CMV-II).  The CMV-II assesses 
the examinee’s understanding of specific words in the Miranda warning (e.g., silence, 
attorney, interrogation).  The examiner presents the word, uses the word in a sentence, 
and reads the word again.  The examinee is asked to provide the meaning of each word in 
his/her own words.  Responses are scored similarly to those of the CMR-II and FRI. 
Total scores range from 0 to 36. Changes to this instrument included adding 12 additional 
words found in updated versions of the warning to the existing six words in the original 
instrument.   
(5) Perceptions of Coercion during the Holding and Interrogation Processes (P-
CHIP). This instrument assesses the examinees’ self-reported likelihood of confession 
behaviors during interrogation.  The examiner reads a hypothetical vignette to the 
examinee, and the examinee is asked to pretend that he/she is the suspect in the story.  
The examiner adds 26 hypothetical police interrogation practices, which are based on 
interrogation tactics outlined in popular police training manuals (e.g., Inbau, Reid, & 
Buckley, 1986), to the original scenario.  Following the reading of each hypothetical 
tactic, the examinee is asked three questions: 1) What would the suspect in the situation 
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do next (i.e., talk to the police about the crime (0 points), talk to the police but not about 
the crime (1 point), or say nothing to the police (2 points))?  2) How is the suspect feeling 
now (i.e., on a scale of 1 to 6 from very stressed to very relaxed)?  3) Would the suspect 
say he committed the crime even if he did not (i.e., on a scale of 1 to 6 from definitely 
yes to definitely no).  This instrument was developed specifically for the revised 
instruments and was not a part of Grisso's original instruments.    
 Judgment in Legal Contexts Instrument (JILC; Woolard, Repucci, Steinberg, 
Grisso, & Scott, 2003). Developed specifically for the MacArthur Juvenile Adjudicative 
Competence Study, the Judgment in Legal Contexts is intended to assess decision making 
in the context of three legal circumstances that criminal defendants commonly face (i.e., 
police interrogation, consultation with an attorney, and plea negotiation).  Because this 
study specifically aimed to evaluate legal decision making in the context of Miranda 
waivers and nonwaivers, only the police interrogation vignette was used.  The examiner 
reads the vignette about a boy who is taken to the police station for questioning about a 
crime in which he was an accomplice.  At the police station, the officers ask the suspect 
to waive his right to silence.  The examinee is then asked to provide the best and worst 
options for the defendant from a list of three possible responses (confessing to the 
offense, denying the offense, and refusing to speak).  
 The examinee is then asked to provide open-ended responses for why he chose 
those options as the “best” and “worst” for the suspect.  These open-ended responses are 
then scored according to three variables associated with the construct of psychosocial 
maturity: risk orientation, future orientation, and resistance to peer influence.  However, 
because adolescent suspects are typically interrogated individually, resistance to peer 
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influence may not be directly relevant to the decisions they make about whether to waive 
their Miranda rights.  Thus, only the constructs of risk orientation and future orientation 
were quantitatively calculated. 
 Risk Orientation.  To assess participants' risk orientation, they are asked to 
identify all positive and negative consequences of each best and worst option, as well as 
the unpleasantness of those risks.  Risk orientation is comprised of two variables: Risk 
Recognition and Risk Appraisal. 
 Risk Recognition assesses participants' abilities to recognize the potential positive 
and negative consequences of each best and worst choice.  The “Risk Recognition 1” 
score (R-Rec1) represents the total number of risks identified for the examinee’s best and 
worst choice for the defendant in the vignette.  The “Risk Recognition 2” score (R-Rec2) 
represents the percentage of a person’s total consequences (both positive and negative) 
that were negative.  Higher R-Rec1 and R-Rec2 scores indicate greater recognition of 
potential risks in legally relevant situations. As these scores are highly correlated (r = 
.59), only the R-Rec1 score was used in the analyses to determine changes in participants' 
abilities to recognize negative consequences, or "risks," associated with their waiver 
decisions in the hypothetical JILC vignette.   
Risk Appraisal assesses participants' beliefs about how likely negative events will 
occur given specific options in a legal decision making situation.  This variable also 
assesses the degree to which the participant finds those negative consequences 
unpleasant.  Risk appraisal is comprised of two scores: the “Risk Appraisal 1” score (R-
App1) and the “Risk Appraisal 2” score (R-App2).  The R-App1 score indicates the 
examinee’s self-reported likelihood that potentially negative consequences will occur.  
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Responses are scored according to a four point scale, with lower scores reflecting the 
belief that positive outcomes will occur and higher scores reflecting the belief that 
negative outcomes will occur. For instance, the examiner explains to the examinee that 
the character in the hypothetical vignette falsely tells the police that he was not involved 
in the crime, when the character actually did commit the crime. The examinee is then 
instructed to rate the likelihood of various outcomes, including that the character will 
definitely go home (1 point), possibly go home (2 points), possibly go to jail (3 points), 
or definitely go to jail (4points). Thus, higher scores reflect more negative appraisals of 
outcomes associated with a legal decision.    
 The R-App2 score measures the examinee’s rating of how unpleasant negative 
consequences would be if they did occur.  To rate the unpleasantness of negative 
consequences, examinees use a four point scale, ranging from “okay” (1 pt.) to 
“extremely bad” (4 pts). 
Future Orientation.  To assess participants' future orientation, they are asked to 
identify as many potential long-term consequences (both positive and negative) as 
possible when considering options in a legal decision making situation.  Future 
orientation is comprised of three variables: “Future Recognition 1” score (F-Rec1), 
“Future Recognition 2” score (F-Rec2), and “Future Recognition 3” score (F-Rec3).  
Using the examinee’s best and worst choices responses, the examinee is asked to 
list the potential positive and negative consequences of those choices.  The F-Rec1 score 
represents the total number of long-term consequences (defined as consequences that 
would occur at least several days after the choice was made) identified for both the best 
and worst choices in the vignette.  The F-Rec2 score represents the percentage of an 
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examinee's total consequences (short- and long-term) that are long term in nature. Similar 
to the Risk Recognition scores, the F-Rec1 and F-Rec2 scores were highly correlated (r = 
.83). Thus, only the F-Rec1 score was used in the analyses to determine changes in 
participants' abilities to recognize long-term consequences, or improved future 
orientation, associated with their waiver decisions in the hypothetical JILC vignette.   
To obtain the F-Rec3 score, participants are asked to provide the main reason why 
their best choice is better than their worst choice for the vignette.  This reason is judged 
as reflecting short or long-term consequences.  
Children's Attitudes to Institutional Authority Scale (CAIAS).   
This instrument assesses participants' perceptions of authority figures, such as 
police, teachers, and their parents.  It is composed of 30 statements about attitudes toward 
these authority figures, and participants respond on a five-point scale, ranging from 
strongly agree to strongly disagree.  Responses are scored according to standardized 
procedures, with higher scores reflecting pro-authority attitudes and lower scores 
reflecting anti-authority attitudes. Scores range from 30 to 150.   
Measures Administered in Part One  
 Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS-2; Gudjonsson, 1984). The GSS-2 is a two-
part measure that provides an overall estimate of an individual's suggestibility by 
assessing: (1) the extent to which individuals are susceptible to suggestion, and (2) the 
extent to which they change their initial responses following negative feedback about test 
performance.   
 Miranda Rights Misconceptions Inventory (MRMI).  This instrument was created 
specifically for this study; it is a true-false questionnaire assessing common 
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misconceptions about the Miranda rights and police interrogation procedures. This 
instrument served as a fidelity check for the first part of the study to ensure that 
participants acquired certain basic concepts.   
5.3: Procedures 
IRB approval was obtained for this study prior to implementing the following 
procedures. Researchers and research assistants obtained parental consent for potential 
participants in one of two ways: 1) I attended school-related activities and provided 
information about the study in person, or 2) I sent home information letters about the 
study with the students and requested that parents contact us for additional information.  
In addition, assent was individually obtained from each of the student participants.  At the 
time of consent and assent, parents and participants agreed to complete the testing at all 
three time periods (i.e., pre, post, and follow-up).   
Prior to collecting data, undergraduate and graduate research assistants completed 
extensive training that included eight hours, across four training days, of didactic 
instruction about each of the measures and supervised practice administrating and scoring 
the assessment battery.  Items requiring judgment in their ratings were discussed and a 
consensus was reached. Research assistants were considered trained when they had 
completed this training and produced scores with 90% interrater agreement compared 
with scores of the primary investigators on three practice assessments. To maintain the 
reliability of data collection at follow-up, this training was repeated one year after the 
pre-assessment training. Research assistants who collected data the year before were 
required to attend one, two-hour refresher course. New research assistants were required 
to attend the full eight-hour training course, over four days.  In addition, to ensure 
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accuracy of scoring, each completed assessment was re-scored by another trained 
research assistant prior to entering the data for analysis. Items with scoring differences 
were discussed with the primary investigators and a consensus was reached.      
Researchers and research assistants met with each participant individually for the 
pre- post-, and follow-up assessments.  During pre-test, participants were administered 
seven instruments: the MRCI-II, the JILC, the WASI, the GSS-2, the CAIAS, the MRMI, 
and a demographics questionnaire, which took approximately 120 minutes.  During the 
post-test and follow-up assessments, participants were administered the MRCI-II, the 
JILC, the CAIAS, and the MRMI, and the total administration took approximately 75 
minutes.  Per prior arrangement with Tower Hill administration, participants were 
assessed during school hours, after school, and on weekends.  All assessments took place 
on school grounds.  Participants were thanked for their participation with a piece of 
candy. 
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CHAPTER 6: RESULTS 
6.1: Analyses for Primary Hypotheses 
A series of 3 (age: 11 and 12 year olds, 13 and 14 year olds, and 15 and 16 year 
olds) X 3 (time: pre-test, post-test, and follow-up) repeated measures Analyses of 
Variance (ANOVAs) were used to evaluate the relationships between age and each 
dependent variable. These dependent variables included factual understanding of 
Miranda rights (measured by factual understanding score1), appreciation of rights 
(measured FRI total score), self-reported likelihood of offering a false confession in 
hypothetical police interrogations scenarios (measured by the P-CHIP, Part C total score), 
identification of potential risks of waiver/assertion decisions (measured by Risk 
Recognition score, R-Rec1), appraisal of risk likelihood (measured by Risk Appraisal 
score, R-App1), appraisal of risk severity (measured by Risk Appraisal score, R-App2), 
and identification of long-range consequences of waiver/assertion decisions (measured by 
Future Recognition score, F-Rec1).  In each analysis, age group served as the between 
subjects factor, and time was the within subjects factor. Alpha was set at .05 for each 
primary analysis.    
As several of the dependent variables may be correlated (i.e., factual 
understanding and appreciation scores and risk recognition, risk appraisal, and future 
orientation scores), I considered conducting a series of repeated measures Multiple 
Analyses of Variance (MANOVAs) to evaluate the relationships over time between age 
                                                 
1 Factual understanding score is a weighted average of the CMR-II, CMR-R-II, and CMV-II.  Although 
these scores should not be combined for clinical use, as each measure of the MRCI-II provides unique 
information about the constructs related to understanding and appreciation of Miranda rights, the scores 
from these measures may be combined for research purposes (Goldstein, et al., 2003).  
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and the dependent variables. However, because this is the first study investigating the 
effect of the curriculum on the various dependent variables, I was interested in examining 
how each of the dependent variables, individually, changed from pre-curriculum 
participation, to post-curriculum participation, to one-year follow-up. In addition, 
MANOVAs are considerably less powerful than ANOVAs, and, because of the small 
sample size, this study already has less than adequate power to detect significant 
differences if they exist. Similarly, because of the already limited power in this study, I 
maintained an alpha of .05 even though multiple ANOVAs increase the risk of Type I 
error. For these reasons, future studies, with larger sample sizes, should consider using 
MANOVAs or other, more advanced methods of analysis. 
 Following the primary analyses, which were designed to determine changes in the 
dependent variables over time, independent t-tests were conducted to consider the role of 
maturation in changes in scores.  As previously discussed, due the lack of a control 
group, youths' follow-up scores on the outcome variables were compared with same aged 
peers' scores at pre-test to rule out the role of maturation and an additional year of 
schooling in changes found from pre-test to one year follow-up.  Because follow-up data 
collection occurred at the same time of year as pre-test data collection, scores of a given 
age group at follow-up should have been comparable to those of same-age peers at pre-
test, if the curriculum had no effect.  If scores of a given age group at follow-up differed 
significantly from scores of same-aged peers at pre-test, the curriculum likely accounted 
for the changed scores. Although this method of accounting for maturation is less than 
ideal, a control group was unavailable for this study (as previously described), and this 
method served as a control analysis, one that is appropriate for a large-scale pilot study. 
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Notably, there was only one 11-year-old participant at follow-up for which to compare 
pre-test scores; thus, this student was excluded from the analyses, and findings are 
presented for participants aged 12 to 16 at follow-up. To account for the inflation of type 
I error from running five analyses for each age, a stricter, experiment wise alpha was 
employed (alpha = .01 per analysis) for these analyses.  Findings are presented in part b 
of each hypothesis below.    
For the primary hypotheses, an a priori power analysis indicated that, with a 
medium effect size (.25 for a repeated measures ANOVA) (Cohen, 1988) and alpha of 
.05, 57 subjects would produce a power of .67.  In other words, if the anticipated effect 
existed, there was a 67% chance it would have been detected in this study.  Although 
acceptable power is typically .80, this dissertation is the first study examining the longer-
term effectiveness of the educational curriculum intervention.  As such, it should be 
considered a large-scale pilot study, and effect sizes serve as the primary focus of 
reported results, rather than statistical significance (although both are reported).  Alpha 
was set at .05 for each analysis, unless otherwise indicated.   
6.1.1: Factual Understanding 
It was expected that youth of various ages would differentially improve over time 
in their factual understanding of Miranda rights as a result of the curriculum.  An 
evaluation of the assumptions associated with conducting an ANOVA revealed that 
Mauchly's test was significant, and the assumption of sphericity had been violated (i.e., 
the groups differed significantly in their variance between levels) (χ2 (2) = 26.19, p 
<.001).  Therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geiser estimates 
of sphericity (γ= .61).  The ANOVA results revealed a significant time x age interaction 
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(F (2.88, 77.7) = 10.53, p<.001), as well as main effects of time (F (1.44, 77.7) = 39.93, 
p<.001) and age (F (2, 54) = 27.74, p <.001).  In addition, using Cohen's (1988) estimates 
of effect size, large effect sizes were found for time (r = .58)  and age (r = .58), and a 
medium effect was found for the time x age interaction (r = .35).  Thus, as expected, it 
appears that the effect of time on participants' scores on measures of factual 
understanding varies by age group.   
Given that a series of ANOVAs were conducted, a conservative post-hoc test was 
used to decrease the likelihood of Type I error. Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons 
revealed that the 10 to 12-year-old participants scored significantly lower than the two 
older groups.  Scores from the 13 and 14 year olds did not differ from those of the 15 and 
16 year olds.  All age groups improved from pre- to post-test, and these improvements 
were maintained at follow-up (see Figure 2).  However, contrary to predictions that the 
13 and 14 year olds would improve most, the youngest age group showed the most 
improvement between pre- and post-test, followed by the 13 and 14 year olds, and trailed 
by the 15 and 16 year olds.  Out of a  possible 2 points, the youngest participants' mean 
factual understanding score at pre-test was 1.31 (SD = .31), which improved to a mean of 
1.66 (SD=.18) at post-test.  This improvement in scores remained at follow-up (mean = 
1.66, SD=.15). Despite the considerable improvements in the 10 to 12 year olds from pre-
test to post-test, their scores remained lower than the scores of both the 13 and 14 and 15 
and 16 year olds.   
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Figure 2: Mean Factual Understanding Scores by Age Group and Time 
 
 
Independent t-tests were conducted to consider the role of maturation in 
improvement in Miranda comprehension from pre-test to follow-up (alpha =.01 per 
analysis).  For participants aged 12 through 16, findings revealed non-significant 
differences between factual understanding scores at follow-up and scores of same-aged 
peers at pre-test (see Figure 3). These findings suggest that, while the curriculum appears 
to have improved factual understanding from pre- to post-testing, its effect at follow-up 
testing diminishes, as the change appears to be better accounted for by maturation. 
Medium to large effect sizes were found for all ages (d ranged from .33 to 1.25), except 
for the 13-year-old participants, in which there was no effect because participants scored 
the same at follow-up as did their same aged peers at pre-test.    
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Figure 3: The Role of Maturity in Changes in Factual Understanding Scores: Mean 
Scores at Follow-up (Year 2) Compared with those of Same-Aged Peers at Pre-test   
(Year 1) 
Note. Differences between same-aged participants at year 1 and year 2 were non-
significant for all groups.   
 
 
6.1.2: Appreciation 
It was expected that youth of various ages would differentially improve over time in 
their appreciation of Miranda rights as a result of the curriculum.  Results failed to detect 
a significant time X age interaction (F (4, 106) = 1.48, p = .22), but significant main 
effects were found for time (F (2, 106) = 12.46, p<.001) and age (F (2, 53) = 8.53, p 
<.001). Similarly, medium effects were found for time (r = .32) and age (r = .37), but a 
small effect was found for the interaction (r =.12).  Similar to factual understanding, 
Bonferroni post-hoc analyses indicated that 10 to12 year olds obtained significantly 
lower scores than both of the older groups.  Interestingly, the 13 and 14 year olds' scores 
consistently improved across time, while scores for the oldest and youngest groups 
improved from pre- to post-test, then decreased from post-test to follow-up.  Despite this 
decrease, the 10 to 12 year olds' follow-up scores remained significantly better than their 
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pre-test scores (F (1, 18) = 9.45, p <.01).  The 15 and 16 year olds' follow-up scores were 
not significantly different from their pre-test scores, however (F (1, 15) = 1.53, p = .56) 
(see Figure 4).   
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Figure 4: Mean FRI Scores by Age Group and Time 
 
 
 
  
 Independent t-tests that were conducted to consider the role of maturation in 
improvement in Miranda rights appreciation revealed non-significant differences 
between average total FRI scores at follow-up and scores of same-aged peers at pre-test 
for participants aged 12 through 15 (see Figure 5).  However, significant differences were 
detected in average scores for participants who were 16 years old at follow-up, compared 
with their same-aged peers at pre-test (t (15) = 5.54, p <.001).  This suggests that the 
curriculum may have improved participants' appreciation of Miranda rights only in the 
oldest group of participants, while maturation and additional education may have been 
more influential in maintaining higher appreciation scores at follow-up for participants 
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aged 12 through 15. A small, negative effect size (d = -.15) was found for the 15 year 
olds, and a medium, negative effect size was found for the 12 year olds.  Positive medium 
to large effect sizes were found for all other ages (d ranged from .54 to 3.13).  
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Figure 5: The Role of Maturity in Changes in FRI Scores: Mean Scores at Follow-up 
(Year 2) Compared with those of Same-Aged Peers at Pre-test (Year 1)  
Note. Significant differences between same-aged participants at year 1 and year 2 were 
detected only in the 16-year-olds (* p < .001).   
 
 
 
6.1.3: Self-Reported Likelihood of Offering a False Confession 
  It was hypothesized that youth of various ages would differentially improve over 
time in their reported likelihood of offering a false confession in a variety of hypothetical 
interrogation scenarios as a result of the curriculum. However, omnibus analyses failed to 
detect a significant time X age interaction for changes in self-reported false confession 
behavior (P-CHIP, Part C; F (4, 106) = .99, p = .41), nor were significant main effects 
found for time (F (2, 106) = 2.48, p=.09) or age (F (2,53) = .71, p =.61) (see Figure 6).  
Furthermore, small effect sizes were found for time (r=.15), age (r=.10), and the 
52 
interaction between the two (r=.10).  Interestingly, however, individual contrasts revealed 
significant differences in self-reported confession behavior from pre- to post-test (F (1,56) 
= 5.15, p <.05), with all age groups reporting a decreased likelihood of falsely confessing 
to a crime in hypothetical police interrogation scenarios at post-test. Contrary to 
predictions that the 13 and 14 year olds would decrease in their self-reported confession 
behavior the most, the 15 and 16 year olds showed the greatest decrease.  Furthermore, 
individual contrasts comparing scores from post-test to follow-up were not significant (F 
(1,53) = 2.4, p = .12).  Notably, while not significant, at follow-up, the 10 to 12 year olds 
were the only group to remain at post-test levels in their likelihood of falsely confessing to 
a crime.  The 13 and 14 year olds reported an increased likelihood of offering false 
confessions in hypothetical police interrogations at follow-up, even greater than their 
reported levels at pre-test.  The 15 and 16 year olds returned to pre-test levels of reporting 
their likelihood of falsely confessing (see Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Mean P-Chip, Part C Scores by Age Group and Time 
Note. Higher scores reflect an increased likelihood to offer a false confession.  
 
 
 
 As no significant differences were found on the P-CHIP, Part C between age 
groups or assessment time from pre- or post-test to follow-up, it was irrelevant to conduct 
a series of t-tests to determine the role of maturation in changes in scores.  
6.1.4: Recognition and Appraisal of Risk Associated with Miranda Waiver Decisions 
As the 15 and 16 year olds were expected to be psychosocially mature enough to 
gain legal reasoning skills if taught, it was hypothesized that their scores on measures of 
risk recognition and risk appraisal would increase the most over time, followed by the 13 
and 14 year olds, and trailed by the 11 and 12 year olds.  When risk recognition (R-Rec-
1) scores were evaluated, Mauchly's test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had 
been violated (i.e., the age groups differed significantly in their variance; χ2 (2) = 6.19, p 
<.05); therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geiser estimates of 
sphericity (γ= .90).  Contrary to predictions, ANOVA results were not significant for time 
(F (1.79, 91.36) = 2.21, p=.12), age (F (2, 51) = .79, p =.461), or time X age interaction 
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(F (3.58, 91.36) = 1.97, p=.11).  Interestingly, although not significant, the oldest group 
continued to decrease in their abilities to recognize the risks associated with Miranda 
wavier decisions over time (see Figure 7). Not surprisingly, these results yielded small 
effect sizes for time (r = .15), age (r = .12), and the interaction (r = .14).  
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Figure 7: Mean Risk Recognition Scores (R-Rec-1) by Age Group and Time 
 
 
 
Regarding risk appraisal (R-App-1) scores, results revealed a main effect for time 
(F (2, 92) = 4.34, p <.05), but no age differences were found in participants' beliefs about 
negative consequences (F (1, 46) = 1.48, p=.24). There was also no time X age 
interaction (F (4, 92) = 1.47, p =.22). Pairwise comparisons for time revealed that 
participants' ratings at post-test were significantly different from ratings at pre-test and 
follow-up. Interestingly, however, although it was expected that the curriculum would 
improve adolescents' appraisal of negative consequences associated with waiver 
decisions, the opposite effect occurred (see Figure 8). Despite the significant finding for 
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time, the associated effect size was small (r = .21), as were effect sizes for age and the 
time X age interaction (r = .18 and .13, respectively).   
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Figure 8: Mean Risk Appraisal-1 Scores (R-App-1) by Age Group and Time 
Note. Scores range from 4 to 16, with higher scores reflecting a higher likelihood of 
negative consequences.  
 
 
 
Finally, findings revealed that participants did not demonstrate significant 
differences in their appraisal of the unpleasantness of negative outcomes (R-App-2) in 
hypothetical criminal scenarios. Results revealed no significant main effects for time (F 
(2, 100) = .02, p=.98), age (F (2, 50) = 1.75, p=.19), or the time X age interaction (F 
(4,100) = 1.06, p = .38) (see Figure 9).  These results also yielded small effect sizes for 
time (r = .01), age (r = .18), and the time X age interaction (r = .10).  
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Figure 9: Mean Risk Appraisal-2 Scores (R-App-2) by Age Group and Time 
Note. Scores range from 4 to 16, with higher scores reflecting a higher perception of 
unpleasantness of negative consequences.  
 
 
 
Similar to the findings from the P-CHIP, Part C, no significant differences were 
found on the R-Rec-1 or R-App-2 between age groups or assessment time.  Although a 
significant main effect for time was found on the R-App1, participants did not improve in 
their risk appraisal from post-test to follow-up. Thus, this analysis was irrelevant.  
6.1.5: Future Orientation 
 It was expected that youth of various ages would differentially improve over time 
in their ability to identify long-, versus, short-term, consequences of waiver decisions. 
Similar to other measures of psychosocial capacities, results failed to detect significant 
changes for the time X age interaction (F (4, 102) = .71, p = .58), or for the effects of 
time (F (2, 102) = .15, p=.86) and age (F (2, 51) = 2.15, p=.13) (see Figure 10).  These 
results also yielded small effect sizes for time (r= .04), age (r = .20), and the time X age 
interaction (r= .08).  
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Figure 10: Mean Future Recognition Scores (F-Rec-1) by Age Group and Time 
 
 
 
Because no significant differences were found in F-Rec-1 scores between age 
groups or assessment time, t-tests examining the role of maturation in improvements 
were irrelevant.    
6.2: Secondary Hypotheses 
The relationship between participants' attitudes towards authority figures (CAIAS 
total scores) and their waiver decisions was investigated. Waiver decisions were based on 
participants' self-choice responses on the JILC (i.e., talk/admit, talk/deny, or remain 
silent). The self-choice response was then recoded into a dichotomous variable of talk 
(i.e., talk/admit and talk/deny responses were combined) or remain silent.  Using logistic 
regression analyses, for each assessment period (pre-test, post-test, and follow-up), 
participants' self-choice responses were regressed onto the CAIAS total score.  Contrary 
to predictions, results revealed that, for each analyses, participants' attitudes towards 
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authorities were not significantly associated with their decisions to talk or remain silent 
(Pre-test: z = 1.30-.02, with SE =.03, p=.54; Post-test: z = 3.08 - .05, with SE = .03, p = 
.06; Follow-up: z = .46-.02, with SE .03, p=.57).   
It was also hypothesized that adolescents' recognition of risks would mediate the 
relationship between age and their appreciation of the significance of their Miranda 
rights, but this mediating relationship would not appear between age and understanding 
of rights. Baron and Kenny's (1986) model was applied, and the first step of the 
mediating analysis revealed that age was not significantly associated with participants' 
risk recognition scores (b = -.03, SE =.16, p = .86, R2 = .001). Therefore, the proposed 
mediating relationship did not exist and the remaining steps in the analyses were not 
performed. 
An analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted to evaluate the relationship 
between previous exposure to the Miranda warning (yes or no) and change scores in 
understanding and appreciation from pre-test to follow-up, covarying age group to 
control for pre-existing, age-based differences in understanding and appreciation. As 
expected, findings showed no significant differences in factual understanding scores from 
pre-test to follow-up between participants with and without prior exposure to the 
Miranda warnings (F (1,53) = 2.80, p=.10) (see Figure 11); participants with previous 
exposure to the Miranda warnings obtained similar scores at pre-test and follow-up as 
those without previous exposure to the warnings. On measures of appreciation, however, 
ANCOVA results revealed that, compared with participants with previous exposure to the 
Miranda warnings, those without previous exposure demonstrated significantly greater 
improvements in appreciation of the function and significance of rights from pre-test to 
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follow-up (F (1.53) = 6.8, p<.05) (see Figure 12). 
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Figure 11: Changes from Pre-test to Follow-up in Factual Understanding of Miranda 
Rights by Prior Exposure to Warnings  
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Figure 12: Changes from Pre-test to Follow-up in Appreciation of Miranda rights by 
Prior Exposure to Warnings 
 
 
 
In an a priori hypothesis, I expected that risk recognition, risk appraisal, and 
future orientation might, theoretically, be influenced by participants' previous experience 
with Miranda rights. However, because the primary analyses failed to detect significant 
improvements in measures of risk recognition, appraisal, and future orientation, this 
analysis was irrelevant.      
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CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION 
This study provides several important contributions to the field's understanding of 
adolescents' capacities for legal learning. Specifically, it is the first to provide 
information about changes in adolescents' understanding and appreciation across three 
time points. Secondly, using a longitudinal design, this study examined the role of an 
educational curriculum, designed to teach adolescents about their Miranda rights, in the 
development of cognitive (i.e., understanding and appreciation) and psychosocial 
capacities (i.e., risk recognition, risk appraisal, and future orientation) associated with 
legal decision-making.  
Results suggest that the cognitive and psychosocial capacities implicated in legal 
learning develop differently. Specifically, for cognitive capacities, instruction provided a 
significant, short-term benefit in improving understanding and appreciation of rights; in 
contrast, cognitive maturation appeared to better account for long-term improvements 
(i.e., one year later).  Contrary to predictions, the psychosocial capacities did not appear 
to change in any meaningful way as a result of either instruction or one-year of 
maturation.   
7.1: Improvements in Cognitive Abilities 
As expected, findings from this study revealed that participants of various ages 
differentially improved in their understanding and appreciation of rights from pre-test to 
follow-up. Despite differences in participants' demographic information (Goldstein et al., 
2003; Grisso, 1980), including IQ score, socioeconomic status (SES), ethnicity, and 
amount of interaction with the legal system, findings from this study were strikingly 
similar to those of previous studies.  Most notably, this study revealed robust age effects 
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similar to those found in previous research; younger youth consistently achieved 
significantly lower scores on measures of understanding and appreciation than did the 
older youth (Goldstein et al., 2003; Grisso 1980; Melton, 1980). Moreover, this pattern of 
results was consistent across each assessment period, suggesting that youth of all age 
included groups could benefit from educational instruction, but developmental limitations 
create a ceiling effect, limiting the level of improvement in the youngest youth.  
An examination of how changes in legal understanding develop show that there 
was a positive, linear relationship between age and improvements in understanding and 
appreciation. However, age-based differences between the older groups narrowed as a 
result of the curriculum; the 13 and 14 year olds achieved similar scores to the 15 and 16 
year olds. Consequently, two, rather than three, distinct groups emerged, the 10 to 12 
year olds and the 13 to 16 year olds. However, although educational instruction appears 
to benefit participants' understanding and appreciation in the short-term, but longer-term 
(i.e., one year follow-up), results of changes a year later suggest that improvements 
appear to be better accounted for by maturation.   
Legal Development Theory (Levine and Tapp, 1977) provides a context for 
understanding these changes, as it proposes that children and adolescents move from a 
simplistic, preconventional view of understanding rights, to a more advanced 
postconventional view. This transition requires both (a) a "values conflict" (i.e., being 
presented with substantive information that may conflict with existing schema and 
forcing reconciliation), and (b) the cognitive capacities to understand and engage in that 
reconciliation process. For instance, given the large percentage of adolescents who 
mistakenly believe that the judge can revoke a youth's right to silence and make him or 
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her talk about the crime, providing accurate information that one's right to silence in an 
entitlement that cannot be revoked by anyone conflicts with the individual's mistaken 
belief. Thus, the individual would be presented with a "values conflict" which may 
facilitate the individual to consider the deeper meaning of the right (i.e., that it is an 
entitlement) to reconcile the conflict, and, in turn, foster an advancement in learning, 
understanding, and appreciating.  The same substantive information was presented to all 
of the participants, and the 13 and 14 year olds may have achieved scores similar to the 
oldest group as a result of possessing similar, requisite cognitive capacities to have 
engaged in a meaningful learning process.  In other words, these two age groups may 
have had the cognitive capacities to reconciliate the "values conflict" between their 
previous beliefs and the new information to move towards a more advanced 
understanding and appreciation of rights.  Consistent with this theory, the 10 to 12 year 
olds showed the most improvement from pre- to post-test but still performed significantly 
lower than the older groups; understanding and appreciation improved as a result of the 
information presented, but this youngest group seemed to lack the necessary cognitive 
capacities to engage in a more advanced learning experience.  
7.2: Self-Reported Likelihood of Offering a False Confession 
In contrast to understanding and appreciation, no significant age effect was found 
for self-reported confession behavior in this study. Despite the lack of age effects, results 
revealed that the curriculum had a significant short-term effect in reducing all 
participants' self-reported confession behavior, but longer-term changes in self-reported 
confession behavior were less direct.  
In contrast to the current findings, previous research has consistently supported 
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age as a significant predictor of false confession behavior (Goldstein et al., 2003; 
Gudjonsson & Singh, 1984; Richardson, Gudjonsson, & Kelly, 1995). However, sample 
differences may account for the absence of age effects in the current study. None of the 
participants in this study reported having been read his or her Miranda rights by a police 
officer or had any experience in interrogations; juvenile offenders served as participants 
in the previous studies. Goldstein and colleagues' (2003) assessed confession behavior 
using the identical measure as in this study, and youth in the current study reported being 
considerably less likely to falsely confess in hypothetical interrogation scenarios at each 
assessment point. The current participants' lack of familiarity with actual interrogation 
scenarios may have made these youth naïve to the stress of being interrogated by 
intimidating police officers, thereby, limiting their abilities to predict their actual 
behavior in the described situation.     
7.3: Changes in Psychosocial Abilities 
 Contrary to expectations, the curriculum produced neither significant nor 
meaningful changes in reasoning abilities related to Miranda waiver decisions (i.e., 
participants' abilities to recognize or appraise the risks associated with Miranda waiver 
decisions or to identify long-term consequences of waiver decisions). Furthermore, 
despite predictions, attitudes towards authority were not related to waiver decisions.  
 Several explanations may account for the absence of psychosocially-related 
changes, including timing of developing psychosocial skills, resistance to changing 
fundamental misconceptions, and measurement issues.  First, as no significant age-based 
differences were detected on any of the psychosocial measures from pre- to post-test, the 
reasoning abilities assessed in this study may depend more on developmental maturation 
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and may be relatively unaffected by the knowledge-based, instructional curriculum. 
Similarly, no significant differences between age groups were found one year later, at 
follow-up.  In light of the neuropsychological research suggesting that the anatomy 
responsible for planning and weighing short- versus long-term consequences of actions 
continues to develop into late adolescence or early adulthood (Gogtay et al., 2004), one 
interim year may not have been long enough to detect the influence of developmental 
maturation on psychosocial abilities in legal decision-making, particularly given the ages 
of participants. Furthermore, researchers examining adolescent decision-making and risk-
taking have suggested that, psychosocial abilities, such as risk recognition and risk 
appraisal, also continue to develop well into late adolescence and early adulthood (e.g., 
Furby & Beyth-Marom, 1990).  Thus, in contrast to the cognitive abilities that appear to 
be influenced by educational instruction that challenges values and beliefs to facilitate 
improved understanding and appreciation, improvement in psychosocial abilities may be 
more related to the natural progression of cognitive and neuropsychological development.  
 Secondly, the lack of age-based changes in psychosocial abilities may be related 
to the idea that misconceptions about legal rights are resistant to change. Consistent with 
previous research (Grisso, 1980), adolescents appear to mistakenly hold the fundamental 
belief that authority figures have the distinct ability to revoke one's right to silence, 
despite having a factual understanding of the meaning of a right. Thus, it appears that, 
consistent with Legal Development Theory (Tapp & Levine, 1977), to change 
participants' perceptions of risk and future consequences related to their legal decision 
making, changes in fundamental beliefs must first occur. For instance, at pre-test, the 
majority of all participants (66.7%) in this study indicated that even if a suspect chooses 
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not to talk, the judge has the authority to force that suspect to talk in court. This 
percentage decreased only slightly, to 44% after the curriculum, despite the curriculum's 
emphasis on the adversarial nature of the legal system and the irrevocability of a right.  
At follow-up, 51% of participants maintained that the right to silence can be revoked by a 
judge. Accordingly, many of the youth reported at all time points that talking and 
admitting to the crime would show cooperation with the police and lead to less 
punishment by the judge. Thus, in contrast to cognitive abilities that may be largely 
influenced by educational instruction, psychosocial abilities may be more related to 
deeper changes in values and beliefs that are better facilitated by cognitive development 
and social maturation (Cauffman & Steinberg, 2000; Grisso et al., 2003; Scott, Reppucci, 
& Woolard, 1995).  
A final explanation for the absence of significant findings in psychosocial abilities 
has to do with measurement issues. For instance, the consistent decreases in the number 
of risks and future consequences from pre-test to follow-up in the oldest group of 
participants may be related to how the measure was scored. Specifically, scores for risk 
recognition and future orientation were calculated by counting the absolute number of 
long-range and adverse consequences provided by the participants, regardless of the 
accuracy of these consequences. For example, the response “if he remains silent, it would 
go on his record and be used against him in court to get more punishment,” was 
considered a long-range consequence and contributed to the Future Recognition score, 
despite the inaccuracy of the statement. Because the JILC scoring instructions do not 
account for the accuracy of responses, decreases in participants' scores may reflect fewer, 
but more accurate, responses over time.  This measurement issue may confound the 
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findings by suggesting that participants' abilities to recognize long-term consequences 
worsened over time (i.e., reported recognizing fewer consequences), when, in fact, those 
abilities may have improved. Notably, the pattern of decreasing scores over time was 
observed only in the oldest group of participants and only for the future orientation scale. 
Thus, this explanation may be insufficient, on its own, to interpret the findings.   
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CHAPTER 8: LIMITATIONS 
 Findings should be interpreted within the context of this study's limitations, 
including small sample size, limited generalizability, lack of a control group, and limited 
ecological validity.  Given the small sample size, this study had less than adequate power 
(.80) to detect meaningful differences, if they existed. As a result, effect sizes were 
emphasized to determine possible effects not detected in the statistical analyses. Despite 
the small sample size, however, significant findings were revealed for understanding and 
appreciation, supporting the robust age outcomes of the study.  
Secondly, participants in this study were markedly different from the at-risk youth 
for which this curriculum is ultimately intended. Although results for understanding and 
appreciation were consistent with previous research with juvenile offenders, sampling 
differences may have affected results associated with self-reported confession behavior 
and psychosocial abilities. Furthermore, given that this is the first study to assess changes 
over time in cognitive and psychosocial abilities resulting from an educational 
curriculum, it is unclear whether the findings will generalize to at-risk youth.  Despite 
these sampling differences, this study was developed to set the stage for a programmatic 
series of research examining adolescents' capacities for legal learning. As such, it was 
important to first determine whether adolescents could benefit from the information 
presented in the curriculum. Using the Tower Hill students, findings revealed that the 
curriculum was beneficial in facilitating improvements in understanding and appreciation 
of rights. However, future research will need to address whether at-risk youth will show 
similar improvements in their understanding and appreciation of rights, given differences 
between at-risk youth and the general population in IQ scores, academic skills, and 
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attentional abilities.   
Third, this study lacked a control group from which comparisons could be made 
about the role of maturity in changes in cognitive and psychosocial abilities. However, 
because of the short time span between pre- and post-test, it is unlikely that 
improvements at post-test would be attributable to maturation. In addition, as follow-up 
assessments were conducted one year after pre-test assessments, pre-test scores on the 
outcome variables from peers from one year earlier served as a baseline from which to 
compare scores at follow-up to determine whether improvements over time were due to 
the curriculum or whether changes were better accounted for by maturation.  
In addition, students may have had conversations with others about the 
curriculum, raising the question of whether improvements resulted from the educational 
curriculum or from the follow-up conversations. Although these discussions may have 
contributed to improved understanding and appreciation, engaging in conversations with 
peers, teachers, and family has been suggested to be a central aspect of information 
processing and learning (Chinn & Brewer, 1992). Thus, rather than coloring the findings, 
participants' conversations with others may have played an important and expected role 
in facilitating their learning about rights. However, future research should directly 
examine the role of these conversations in the development of participants' understanding 
and appreciation of rights.    
 Finally, although participants in this study demonstrated improved factual 
understanding and appreciation of their rights, the ecological validity of these gains 
remains unclear. While a basic factual understanding of one's Miranda rights is necessary 
to adequately waive rights, other factors that are outlined in the Totality of 
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Circumstances, such as the circumstances of the interrogation and arrest (e.g., time of day 
that the interrogation takes place, length of time the suspect is held and/or questioned, 
severity of the charges, police demeanor), may strongly influence an adolescent’s waiver 
decision (Grisso, 2003). In addition, as presented in this study, psychosocial factors (e.g., 
recognition and appraisal of risk, future orientation) may also influence an adolescent's 
waiver decision. Consequently, it is unclear how gains in understanding and appreciation 
translate into real-life situations in which adolescents make waiver decisions.    
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CHAPTER 9: IMPLICATIONS 
As adolescents are facing increasingly punitive sentences and policies are making 
transfer to adult court more common (Grisso, 1998; Heilbrun et al., 1997; Poythress et 
al., 2006), understanding factors that influence, facilitate, and impede adolescents' legal 
decision making is critical. This study suggests that adolescents' understanding and 
appreciation of rights are malleable factors that may be improved through educational 
instruction, which is promising considering that "law-related education (LRE) projects 
flourish at national, state, and local levels" (ABA, n.d.). However, findings from this 
study raise interesting considerations for further research and policy decisions. First, as 
law-related education is becoming more prevalent, the theoretically and empirically-
based curriculum implemented in the current study may serve as a model to introduce 
into a wider, school-based legal education program. This study yielded promising results, 
and implementing it on a larger scale would allow for further research examining its 
effectiveness with other populations, including at-risk youth.    
In terms of policy implications, this study highlights the importance of evaluating 
adolescents' cognitive and psychosocial abilities in determining their capacities to waive 
legal rights. Although the admissibility of adolescents' Miranda waivers has been 
conceptualized as an ability to "comprehend the warnings…grasp the significance of 
rights…and process information" (Grisso, 1998, p. 50), research on adolescents' abilities 
to provide valid waivers has typically been limited to the first two abilities, understanding 
and appreciation of the significance of the rights (Goldstein et al., 2003; Grisso, 1980), 
with less attention focused on the last ability, the influence of psychosocial abilities in 
waiver decisions.  Findings from this study revealed that, after educational instruction, 
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13- to 16-year-old participants demonstrated similar levels of understanding and 
appreciation of their rights. However, no significant age-based differences were found 
between 10- and 16-year-old participants' abilities to recognize and accurately appraise 
risks and foresee future consequences of waiving rights. Consequently, even if 
adolescents display an adequate factual understanding and appreciation of their rights, 
their immature psychosocial abilities may impair their capacity to make an informed 
waiver decision.       
If similar results were found with at-risk youth as were found with this sample, 
several important policy implications may arise. First, given that psychosocial abilities, 
which are theoretically related to legal decision making, appear deficient in the upper 
range of our adolescent sample,, questions may be raised about the benefits of presenting 
Miranda warnings to adolescent suspects under the age of 16; if, as a group, they 
demonstrate pronounced difficulties making informed decisions about rights waivers, 
even after legal education, the reading of rights to youth under age 16, prior to 
interrogation, may not offer the protections it was designed to provide.  One method of 
protecting youthful suspects, however, would be to automatically assign an attorney to be 
present with adolescents prior to the police beginning the interrogation process and to 
assist the adolescent in making a waiver decision.  Of course, from a practical standpoint, 
this method would require extensive resources and would interfere with the freedom of 
police to interrogate adolescent suspects and obtain confessions.  Consequently, this 
alternative method of protection may not be politically palatable, and a balance between 
these two competing forces in the adversarial interrogation process would need to be 
reached. 
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A second policy implication concerns the levels at which factual understanding, 
appreciation, and other psychosocial factors that influence decision making are judged to 
be adequate for a valid waiver of one's rights. Jurisdictions differ in the weight they place 
on each of these factors (Viljoen, Zapf, & Roesch, 2007), with some jurisdictions 
requiring only a basic understanding of rights, others requiring a higher level of 
appreciation, and others considering the degree to which youth are able to use that 
information to make informed decisions.  These jurisdictional differences in requirements 
for a valid rights waiver should result in different percentages of youth providing valid 
and invalid waivers. Consequently, findings from a parallel study with an at-risk 
population could provide information about the degree to which adolescents of various 
ages possess the requisite capacities to meet the various standards, after a brief 
educational session.   
Although it appears reasonable to assume that psychosocial factors play a role in 
Miranda waivers, the findings from this study revealed no meaningful changes in 
psychosocial factors across age groups or over time. Although the possibility exists that 
the lack of changes in these factors may be a result of limited development in these 
capacities, it is also important to consider the possibility that no changes in these factors 
were detected because they are not relevant to Miranda waiver decisions.  The lack of a 
meaningful relationship should be considered; however, further research is needed, as 
evaluation of psychosocial factors to Miranda was narrow in scope in this study.  
Additional assessment tools and other psychosocial factors might better examine the role 
of psychosocial maturity in the development of Miranda waiver capacities. 
Although this study is the first empirical longitudinal investigation of a 
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curriculum designed to teach adolescents about their rights, there is a "current global 
trend in civic education" (Caliber Associates, 2001). As a result, the temptation may exist 
to generalize the findings from this study to other law-related education programs. 
Specifically, findings from this study revealed that, through educational instruction, 13 
and 14 year olds' abilities to understand and appreciate their rights may be comparable to 
those of 15 and 16 year olds. If this finding were generalized to other law-related 
programs, it may perpetuate the perception that younger adolescent offenders possess 
similar abilities to their older adolescent counterparts, if taught, and promote the 
transferring of younger adolescents to criminal court. That is not an accurate 
interpretation of the findings, given the significant role of maturity in both long-term 
changes in understanding and appreciation, as well as changes in abilities to recognize 
and weigh risks and foresee future consequences of rights waiver decisions. Furthermore, 
as this study was conducted with participants who were markedly different from 
adolescent offenders, further research needs to assess whether results from this study 
generalize to the populations of concern.   
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